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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel' bars the relitigation of is-
sues by a party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
those issues in a prior action. 2 Since the doctrine tends to preserve
judicial resources, 3 the trend in recent years has been to expand its
I The doctrine of collateral estoppel must be distinguished from the related concept of
res judicata. Under res judicata, a judgment on the merits will bar relitigation of the same
cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them. See Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948); 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 621-29 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE'S]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT]. In contrast, collateral estoppel applies when the subsequent
lawsuit is based upon a different cause of action. In such a situation the judgment in the first
action is conclusive as to issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of that suit.
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 68, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); see Tait v. Western Md.
Ry., 289 U.S. 620, 623 (1933); Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1876); 1B
MOORE'S, supra 0.441[2], at 3777. See generally Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of
Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REV. 217 (1954). For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, see Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
2 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
333 (1971); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, 444 F.2d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It
would be a violation of due process to bind a party to a prior adjudication to which he had
not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r., 24
N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969). In determining whether collateral
estoppel should be invoked, the courts examine numerous factors. See United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). For example, in Zdanok
v. Gliddon Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), an employer who
had lost a suit brought by one employee, sought to relitigate the same issues in a subsequent
suit brought by other employees. Since the employer was fully aware of his exposure to these
additional claims at the time of the first trial, the court held that it was fair to invoke
collateral estoppel. See 327 F.2d at 953; cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines,
Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 538-41 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966) (court refused to
apply collateral estoppel where first action not strenuously litigated). Mutuality of parties
often is another important factor. See note 4 infra. Similarly, whether collateral estoppel is
asserted in an offensive or defensive manner is an important consideration when applying the
full and fair opportunity test. Collateral estoppel is used offensively when the plaintiff seeks
to estop the defendant from contesting an issue he had previously litigated. Defensive collat-
eral estoppel, on the other hand, is invoked by the defendant to prevent litigation of an issue
which the plaintiff has already litigated against another defendant. See Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 289 (1957); Note,
The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The Impacts].
See 1B MOORE's, supra note 1, $ 0.441[2], at 3779; see, e.g., McConnell v. Nooner,
547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Burns v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 530 F.2d 1201 (5th
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applicability.4 An important issue which, until recently, had not
been definitively resolved, was whether collateral estoppel effect
could be given to determinations made in a fully contested equitable
proceeding, where the effect would be to preclude a party from
exercising his seventh amendment right to a jury trial5 in a subse-
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976); Reich v. City of Freeport, 527 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1976);
Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1975); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490
F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1973).
For many years, the doctrine of mutuality of parties required that for a prior adjudica-
tion to be given estoppel effect, both parties must have been bound by it. See 1B MOORE'S,
supra note 1, T 0.411[1], at 1251; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 93 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976);
see, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642-46 (1936); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of
Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.,
225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912). Those in favor of the doctrine reasoned that, absent mutuality, a
party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked could be deprived of his day in court, unfair
results could occur where multiple claimants are involved and the joinder of all interested
parties would be discouraged. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301, 308 (1961); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and
Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968). See also Currie, supra note 2. Exceptions
to the mutuality requirement were recognized in situations where its application would be
unfair. For example, sureties were permitted to invoke collateral estoppel in an action brought
by a creditor when there had been a prior adjudication in favor of the principal debtor. See,
e.g., United States v. Coast Wineries, 131 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1942); People v. Metropolitan
Sur. Co., 171 App. Div. 15, 156 N.Y.S. 1027 (3rd Dep't 1916); Gill v. Morris, 58 Tenn. 614
(1872). Mutuality was also dispensed with in vicarious liability situations where the liability
of the party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel was derived solely from the conduct of one
exonerated for that conduct in a prior suit. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128 (1912). These exceptions were developed by the courts in
an effort to avoid the inconsistency of having the principal exonerated while the secondary
party is found liable. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 96-99 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976);
Moore & Currier, supra, at 311; Note, The Impacts, supra note 2, at 1016.
Today, mutuality of parties is no longer a requirement for invoking collateral estoppel.
This development can be traced to the landmark case of Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, Judge Traynor advanced theories of collateral
estoppel that are generally accepted today:
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of [collateral estoppel]
differ fundamentally from the criteria against whom a plea of [collateral estoppel]
may be asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the assertion of a
plea of [collateral estoppel] against a party unless he was bound by the earlier
litigation in which the matter was decided. . . . There is no compelling reason,
however, for requiring that the party asserting the plea of [collateral estoppel]
must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.
Id. at 809, 122 P.2d at 894.
Since that decision it has been held that due process considerations do not require
mutuality of parties as a condition to the application of collateral estoppel. See United States
v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-26 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). In 1971, the Supreme
Court settled the question holding that mutuality is not required. Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971);-see Cheramie v. Tucker,
493 F.2d 586, 589 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Humphreys v. Tann, 487
F.2d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
The seventh amendment provides:
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quent legal action brought by a different plaintiff.' In Shore v. Park-
lane Hosiery Co.,7 the Second Circuit addressed this question and
held that, despite the absence of mutuality of parties, collateral
estoppel could be invoked to prevent a party from obtaining a jury
trial on issues which were fully litigated in a prior nonjury proceed-
ing.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed
Shore was a class action instituted on behalf of minority share-
holders of Parklane Hosiery Co., charging twelve directors, officers
and stockholders of Parklane with issuing a proxy statement con-
taining materially false and misleading statements. 0 The proxy
statement was sent to all stockholders to inform them that a meet-
ing would be held to consider a proposed merger of Parklane with a
privately-owned company controlled by the twelve individual de-
fendants." The stockholders contended that the proxy statement
failed to disclose that the actual purpose of the merger was to satisfy
the personal indebtedness of one of the defendants." While this
action was pending, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) brought an injunctive suit against Parklane alleging the
same facts." The nonjury SEC trial went to judgment first, the
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in
actions at law, but not actions in equity or admiralty. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
195 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970). See generally 5 MOORE'S, supra note
1, 38.11[51, at 118.
1 Compare Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971),
with Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4079 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979)
565 F.2d at 818.
47 U.S.L.W. 4079 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979).
565 F.2d at 816. The plaintiff alleged violations of §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
11 Id. Following the meeting of the stockholders, Parklane merged with New PLHC Corp.
Id. The minority stockholders were paid $2 per share subject to appraisal rights. Id. at 816-
17.
,z Id. at 817. In addition to arguing that a merger would not serve any valid corporate
objective, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants did not reveal that termination of
negotiations with respect to a lease held by Parklane would result in the loss of substantial
financial benefits. Id. The complaint also charged that the appraisers employed by the defen-
dants had insufficient information to make an accurate valuation of the shares. Id. Damages,
costs, rescission of the merger and other appropriate relief as the court might grant were
requested. Id.
11 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff7d, 558 F.2d 1083
(2d Cir. 1977). The action brought by the SEC alleged violations of § 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1976), §§ 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
[Vol. 53:326
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district court holding that there were "material misstatements and
omissions" in the proxy statement, constituting a violation of sec-
tion 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'1 On the basis of
the decision in the SEC action, the plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment in the class action, contending that collateral estoppel
precluded the defendants from relitigating any material issues of
fact regarding liability.'5 The motion was denied by the district
court on the basis of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rachal v. Hill,,6
which held that "the seventh amendment right to a jury trial of
contested issues of fact [survives] any prior non-jury adjudica-
tion."' 7
A unanimous Second Circuit reversed.'8 Writing for the court,"
Judge Mansfield initially noted the well-established principle that,
notwithstanding the absence of mutuality of parties, the determina-
tion of an issue in a prior equitable proceeding is binding on a court
of law. 20 Concluding that the technical requirements of collateral
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976) and the various rules applicable to
those sections. 422 F. Supp. at 477. The SEC sought a preliminary injunction and the
appointment of a special counsel to make a new appraisal of the value of the stock. Id. The
court granted a request by both parties that the hearing on the preliminary injunction be
joined with the trial of the alleged violation. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp.
at 479.
"1 422 F. Supp. at 486. In determining whether the falsehoods and omissions were mate-
rial Judge Duffy applied the test set forth in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438 (1976). Since Northway requires a "showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the delibera-
tions of the reasonable shareholder," id. at 449, Judge Duffy held that the deficiencies were
material and, therefore, constituted violations. 422 F. Supp. at 486. At the conclusion of trial,
Judge Duffy refused to order an injunction against future violations since there was no
likelihood of reoccurrence and determined that appointment of special counsel would not be
appropriate. Id. at 487. Parklane was ordered to correct the nondisclosures and misstate-
ments. Id. Judge Duffy's findings were upheld by the Second Circuit. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.
1977).
11 565 F.2d at 818.
'e 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
" 435 F.2d at 64. Rachal involved a shareholder's derivative suit to recover damages
incurred as a result of violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976), and § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(1976). The complaint
charged that the defendants had fraudulently manipulated the price of the capital stock of
the corporation for their own benefit. 435 F.2d at 64. As in Shore, an adjudication of essen-
tially the same issue had been reached in a prior SEC injunctive suit, and the plaintiff moved
for summary judgment on the basis of that determination. Id. The Rachal court denied the
motion for summary judgment on the ground that defendants would be deprived of their
constitutional right to a jury trial in the private action if collateral estoppel effect were given
to the earlier findings of the SEC suit. Id.
"s 565 F.2d at 818. The district court certified its order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976). Because a controlling question of law was involved, the Second Circuit permitted
interlocutory appeal in order to avoid an unnecessary trial. 565 F.2d at 818.
11 The unanimous panel consisted of Circuit Judges Mansfield and Timbers and District
Judge Dooling of the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
565 F.2d at 818. Judge Mansfield noted that it is long settled that findings in equitable
1979]
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estoppel had been met, the court next considered whether the sev-
enth amendment requires that the defendants be given the oppor-
tunity "to relitigate the same issues of fact before a jury."2' Pointing
out that the right to a jury trial only applies where factual issues
are in dispute, 2 the court rejected the proposition advanced by the
Fifth Circuit in Rachal that the Supreme Court's decision in Beacon
proceedings are entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent trials at law. Id. (citing Katchen
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1966); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 159 (1899); Smith v.
Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332,
343 (2d Cir. 1973)); see Paramount Transp. Sys. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 436
F.2d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood
Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Restatement adopts the general rule that "where in a proceeding in equity a question
of fact is actually litigated and determined by final and valid decree, the determination is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent proceeding either at law or in equity on a
different cause of action." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment j, at 305 (1942). Prior
to the merger of law and equity, a plaintiff could dictate whether the issues would be tried
before a jury or not by exercising his choice of forum. Several alternatives existed whereby
the plaintiff could sue in equity, obtain a nonjury trial, and still obtain legal relief. As a part
of the "clean-up doctrine," a plaintiff could enter a prayer for damages incidental to his
equitable cause of action. See, e.g., Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primos Chem. Co., 225 F.
769 (E.D. Pa. 1915), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 719 (1924). A second alternative available to a
plaintiff was to commence his action in equity and, at the conclusion of the action, sue at
law for damages thereby obtaining a jury trial solely for that issue. On the other hand, if a
plaintiff desired a jury trial, he could bring his first action at law and bind the defendant to
a jury determination of the issues. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS, § 68 (1942); McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L. REV.
726, 729 (1960); Note, Civil Procedure-Right to Jury Trial-Collateral Estoppel, 40 U. CIN.
L. REV. 373, 375 (1971).
22 565 F.2d at 819.
22 Id.; see Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1902); Diamond Door Co. v. Lane-Stanton
Lumber Co., 505 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1974). In support of its position that there was no
jury trial right in the absence of a question of material fact, the court noted the summary
judgment procedure available under Rule 56 of Federal Rules of Procedure. 565 F.2d at 819
(citing Diamond Door Co. v. Lane-Stanton Lumber Co., 505 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1957)). The Federal Rules also provide
that a directed verdict may be granted if the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict
in favor of the party against whom the judgment is rendered. 565 F.2d at 819 (citing Baltimore
& Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)); see FED. R. Civ. P. 50. In addition, a jury
may be denied where it is not promptly demanded. 565 F.2d at 819; see FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
In concluding that a denial of a jury trial under the facts in Shore would not violate the
seventh amendment, the court stated:
The party seeking the retrial has already exercised his right to be heard on the
issues and to cross-examine witnesses with respect to them. The interests of final-
ity, certainty and economy of judicial resources then come into play to preclude his
relitigating the same issue a second or third time, with the possibility of inconsis-
tent findings, absent some showing of fundamental unfairness in the prior pro-
ceeding or some unusual circumstances such as fraud that would render inappro-
priate the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
565 F.2d at 819 (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); Cromwell v.
County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1876)).
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Theatres v. Westover2 mandates a jury trial where the element of
mutuality is not present.24 Judge Mansfield interpreted Beacon
Theatres as merely requiring a court to arrange the trial of the legal
- 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff was a movie theatre operator
who had acquired the exclusive right to show first-run films in a certain area. The defendant
built a drive-in theatre in the area and threatened the plaintiff with a treble damage suit for
antitrust violations for possessing the exclusive rights. Id. at 502. The plaintiff thereupon
sought a declaratory judgment that no antitrust violation existed and an injunction prohibit-
ing the defendant from bringing the antitrust suit. Id. at 502-03. In turn, the defendant
counterclaimed for treble damages alleging antitrust violations and demanded a jury trial as
to disputed factual issues. Id. at 503. Since the complaint stated a traditionally equitable
cause of action for which no right to jury trial is recognized, and the counterclaim a cause of
action cognizable at law for which there is such a right, the issue before the Court was whether
defendant was entitled to a jury trial as to the common factual issues. Id. at 505. Noting the
collateral estoppel effect which a determination of the factual issues in a prior trial of an
equitable cause of action would carry, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right
to trial by jury required an adjudication before a jury of common issues of fact where a legal
cause of action had been properly joined with an equitable claim for relief. Id. at 510; see
565 F.2d at 820. See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1961).
24 565 F.2d at 820. Shore represents the culmination of the Second Circuit's disinclina-
tion toward the Fifth Circuit's position in Rachal. In Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc.,
490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973), the court had before it a purely equitable cause of action and
held that damages could be awarded as part of the equitable relief without a jury determina-
tion. Id. at 342. In so ruling, the court stated that it was "not at all sure that Rachal was
correctly decided." Id. at 343 n.15. More recently, in Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974), the court delayed continuance of a nonjury trial pending completion
of a jury trial on the same issue. The Goldman action was one of several similar claims
pending against the same defendant which were to be litigated in separate trials. Id. at 77.
One such action, in which all parties had waived their jury trial right, was designated the
first to be tried. Fearing the collateral estoppel effect that a nonjury determination would
have, Goldman petitioned for an order staying the nonjury trial until the completion of a jury
trial on the issues. Id. Granting this motion, the Second Circuit reasoned that "[flor the
district court to proceed with the nonjury trial ... threatens destruction of . .. [an]
important collateral right to a jury trial." Id. at 78. In a strong dissent, Judge Oakes argued
that the Second Circuit should have waited until the question of the effect to be given nonjury
determinations in a subsequent action was properly before the court. Id. at 79 (Oakes, J.,
dissenting). In resolving this question, the Shore court concluded:
In view of the limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Beacon
Theatres and its inherent respect for the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we do not
view the case, either in logic or in spirit, as requiring us to hold that after a litigant
has had a full and fair non-jury trial of issues he may always invoke the Seventh
Amendment to obtain a second trial of the same issues. To so hold would violate
basic principles of fairness, finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial
resources, avoidance of possibly inconsistent results, and achievement of the "just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
565 F.2d at 821 (footnotes omitted). Judge Mansfield went on to say that the deprivation of
a jury trial was not unfair because the defendants had made no effort to preserve their jury
trial right. He suggested that defendants should have requested a jury trial or an advisory
jury in the SEC action or sought to expedite trial of the private action so as to reach a
judgment before the SEC decision was rendered. Id. at 822. More recent cases indicate that
attempts to follow these suggestions have not been successful. See note 44 infra.
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and equitable issues so as to protect the right to a jury trial. It was
reasoned that the Supreme Court's concern over the sequence of
trial stemmed from its assumption that collateral estoppel would
preclude a jury trial on issues common to the equitable and legal
claims if the equitable claims were tried first.25 The Shore court also
rejected the argument that, since the seventh amendment preserves
the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law,2" where mutual-
ity of parties was a prerequisite to the application of collateral es-
toppel, the recent abandonment of mutuality should not work to
preclude a jury trial. 21 Concluding that a rigid view of the trial by
,1 In Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court recognized that if the equitable claim were
heard first, there would be no right to a jury trial with respect to common issues in the trial
of a legal claim. The Court stated that
the effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the Court of Appeals
believed, "to limit the petitioner's opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue
which has a bearing upon its treble damage suit," for determination of the issue
of clearances by the judge might "operate either by way of res judicata or collateral
estoppel so as to conclude both parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial
of the treble damage claim."
359 U.S. at 504. Following Beacon Theatres, it was assumed that an equitable determinatior.
could provide the basis for invoking collateral estoppel in a subsequent legal proceeding. See
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472
(1962). Dairy Queen involved a contract dispute between the plaintiff licensor and defendant
licensee of a copyrighted trade name. In violation of the provision of the copyright contract,
the defendant defaulted in his annual payments. Id. at 475. The plaintiff brought suit,
requesting injunctive relief prohibiting further use of the copyright name and an accounting
to determine the exact amount owed to him by the defendant. Id. The Supreme Court viewed
the complaint as joining an equitable claim for an injunction with a legal claim for damages
and, citing Beacon Theatres, held that the common factual issues had to be tried before a
jury. Id. at 473. In Katchen, the petitioner objected to the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to
recover a preference in a summary proceeding on the grounds that it would deny him his
seventh amendment jury trial in a plenary proceeding. In rejecting the petitioner's argument
the Court stated: "Both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen recognize that there might be
situations in which the Court could proceed to resolve the equitable claim first even though
the results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the legal claim." 382 U.S. at 339-40;
accord, Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v.
American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec.
Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The commentators have favored this
interpretation of Beacon Theatres. See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in
Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 446 (1971); Note, Goldman,
Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein: The Application of Collateral Estoppel Principles in Derogation of
the Right to Jury Trial, 1974 DUKE L.J. 970.
26 565 F.2d at 822; see Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364, 377-78 (1913). See generally 5 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 38.08[5], at 79; Shapiro &
Coquillette, supra note 25, at 449.
11 565 F.2d at 822. The defendants in Shore relied upon Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935), where it was held that it was a violation of the seventh amendment to compel a
plaintiff to accept a judge's increased award for personal injuries. The Second Circuit in Shore
found that the strict historical approach utilized in Dimick has been somewhat weakened by
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 565 F.2d at 822 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396
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jury right as it existed in 1791 was unwarranted, Judge Mansfield
determined that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of issues de-
termined in the SEC suit. 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart stated that,
while offensive use of collateral estoppel raises a question of fairness
not present when the doctrine is used defensively, under the facts
presented, it did not operate to deprive the defendants of a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. 9 Adding that there is no reason "why
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether
or not mutuality of parties is present,"30 the Court affirmed the
Second Circuit's decision. 31
The Shore result is consistent with the spirit of Beacon
Theatres and the historical underpinnings of the seventh amend-
ment. In Rachal, the Fifth Circuit adopted the position that collat-
eral estoppel could not extinguish the defendant's right to a jury
trial since, in 1791,32 the doctrine could not be invoked unless there
was mutuality of parties.3 3 It appears that the Shore analysis is a
more accurate statement of the relationship of the doctrine of mu-
tuality and the seventh amendment. Mutuality was intended to be
a consideration in the application of collateral estoppel, not a char-
acteristic of the right to trial by jury. Thus, the reliance of the
Rachal court on the absence of mutuality to preserve the defen-
U.S. 531 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968)). Dimick was also distinguished on
the ground that it involved a personal injury action which had existed at common law while
there was no common law counterpart to the SEC injunctive suit. 565 F.2d at 823.
" 565 F.2d at 823. This type of approach, which rejects an inflexible analysis of the
common law jury right, allows for the development of procedural devices which have no
common law counterparts. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). In Galloway,
the Court held that directed verdicts did not violate the seventh amendment and stated that
the seventh "[a]mendment was designed to preserve the . . . jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then
so widely among common-law jurisdictions." Id. at 392.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645, 647 (1979).
Id. at 654. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist observed that the seventh amend-
ment requires an inquiry into the common law practice of jury trial as it existed in 1791. He
reasoned that, since the requirement of mutuality would preclude the use of collateral estop-
pel at that time, it could not be invoked in Parklane to deprive the petitioner of his right to
a jury trial. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3, Id. at 655. The Court pointed out other procedural developments, such as directed
verdict, summary judgment, and retrial of damages, which diminish the scope of jury trial
and yet have not been held to violate the seventh amendment. Id. at 654.
32 The seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791. See
5 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 38.07[1], at 44.1. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not affect this substantive right as it simply preserves "[t]he right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a); see Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
31 435 F.2d at 64.
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dant's jury trial right is misplaced. Since equitable determinations
have always been binding on a court of law, the recent abandonment
of the doctrine of mutuality should not work to bar application of
collateral estoppel where the defendant has had a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate.34
The offensive use of collateral estoppel is a natural outgrowth
of the abandonment of the mutuality requirement.35 Nevertheless,
its use leads to several negative consequences that do not result
when the doctrine is employed defensively.36 It has been pointed out,
for example, that offensive collateral estoppel acts counter to the
goals of judicial economy. Since a judgment favorable to one plain-
tiff can be relied upon by others, while an unfavorable determina-
tion is not binding, potential claimants are encouraged to adopt a
"wait and see" attitude." Defensive collateral estoppel, 6n the other
hand, prevents a plaintiff from "switching adversaries" to relitigate
issues that already have been adjudicated, and encourages joinder
of all potential defendants in a single action.38 A further argument
offered in opposition to offensive collateral estoppel is that a defen-
, In endorsing the abandonment of the mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Supreme Court ques-
tioned "whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issues." Id. at 328. In so stating, the Court
articulated a basis for a more flexible approach to the use of collateral estoppel. Illustrative
of this approach is Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1969), wherein the New York Court of Appeals indicated that "the size of the claim, the
forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence
and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise
verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future litigation" are all factors
to be considered when questioning the applicability of collateral estoppel. Id. at 72, 246
N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
1 The decision in Shore was foreshadowed by recent case law in the federal courts, see,
e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Mary-
land v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967); United States v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), aff'd., 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), as well as in the state courts, see, e.g., Vanguard Recording
Soc'y v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 410, 100 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972); Thill v. Modern
Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super.
96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); B.R. De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970).
11 Some courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel offensively. See, e.g., McCook
v. Standard Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 256, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958). Others, while expressing reservations, have permitted its
application. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). See
generally Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts, supra note 2.
11 See Navarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958);
Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
11 See Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
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dant confronted with a suit for nominal damages or nonmonetary
relief may have less incentive to offer a vigorous defense or seek
appeal from an adverse decision.39 Since foreseeability is a key ele-
ment in assessing the fairness of invoking collateral estoppel, some
argue that it is unfair to preclude the defendant from contesting an
issue de novo if the impact of a prior suit could not have been fully
appreciated. 0 The potential for unfairness is particularly acute
where the defendant is subject to a multitude of separate lawsuits.
In Professor Currie's classic collision example," it is noted that a
judgment in favor of one plaintiff might be given preclusive effect
in subsequent actions, although several prior suits against the de-
fendant resulted in a finding of no liability.2
Permitting offensive estoppel under the facts of Shore, however,
does not present any of these problems. The defendant was well
aware of the pending private suit, had vigorously contested the SEC
suit and had pursued an appeal to the Second Circuit where the
decision of the district court was affirmed.13 Nor can the plaintiffs
in the private suit be said to have adopted a "wait and see" attitude
since they could not have joined in the SEC action."
11 See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). In Berner, the court refused to invoke collateral estoppel
since the prior suit involved a judgment for $35,000 that was not appealed and the plaintiff
in the second suit was asserting a claim for $7,000,000. 346 F.2d at 538-41.
11 In the leading case of Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 720 (1944), Judge Learned Hand indicated that foreseeability was a primary considera-
tion in determining whether the use of collateral estoppel is unfair in a particular case. 141
F.2d at 929.
"1 Currie, supra note 2. Currie reevaluated offensive estoppel in a later article and con-
cluded that his original criticism of its use may have been overbroad. See Currie, Civil
Procedure: the Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 27 (1965).
42 Currie, supra note 2, at 285. Professor Currie referred to this situation as the "Multiple
Claimant Anomaly." In his example, 50 passengers were injured in a train accident and
brought suit against the railroad for personal injuries. Although the railroad prevailed in the
first 25 suits, it was unable to use these determinations against subsequent plaintiffs because
they had not been parties to the first suit. If the 26th passenger wins, offensive estoppel would
allow all subsequent plaintiffs to invoke that judgment to establish the railroad's negligence.
Such a result would not comport with notions of fairness. Id.
, SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
"In Shore, the court stated that the defendants could have protected their jury trial
right by requesting a stay of the proceedings until conclusion of the private suit or by request-
ing that the court try the SEC action before a jury or an advisory jury. 565 F.2d at 821-22.
To the extent that defendants' requests would hinder the SEC in the exercise of its duties
under the securities laws, several lower federal courts, under facts similar to Shore, have
denied such requests and ordered that the Commission be allowed to proceed unobstructed
regardless of collateral estoppel effects. See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc.,
574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant not entitled to ajury trial in an SEC suit merely because
collateral estoppel will be invoked against him in a subsequent private suit); SEC v. Hart,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,454 (D.D.C. May 26, 1978)
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The decision to allow offensive use of collateral estoppel should
have a significant impact in a number of areas. For example, Shore
can be expected to encourage settlements by defendants in SEC
actions in order to avoid the collateral estoppel consequences of an
unfavorable judgment. 5 This development will be most noticeable
where an injunction is issued and its consequences are slight. 6 In
addition, where a defendant has suffered an unfavorable judgment
ina prior SEC suit, private suitors can be expected to rely on Shore
and pursue their claims. In this respect, Shore may provide a boost
to the initiation of class action suits. 7 Since liability may be par-
tially or wholly established by a prior adjudication, the cost of litiga-
tion will be subsequently reduced and the prospect for success en-
hanced. Hesitancy to meet the high costs which now characterize
the initiation of a class action are thereby counterbalanced. 8 Thus,
Shore can be expected to result in more effective enforcement of the
securities laws by promoting a greater number of private suits. 9
Moreover, the logic of the decision can be extended outside the
securities area and may have far-reaching implications on antitrust,
employment discrimination and consumer litigation."
(defendant's request for advisory jury in SEC suit denied); SEC v. Wills, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,321 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1978) (request for an advisory
jury denied); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (requests
for jury trial in SEC suit denied on ground that action was equitable in nature). Similarly,
Congress expressly provided that, absent the consent of the SEC, actions instituted by the
SEC pursuant to the securities laws are not to be consolidated with private actions, even
where common questions of fact are involved. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976); see S. REP. No. 94-
75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 254-
55 wherein it was stated:
Where the Commission sues for an injunction, it has already developed evi-
dence of the existence of fraudulent actions, actual and threatened. If not hindered
by the possibility of transfer and consolidation with claims of private litigants, it
is then in a position to seek prompt preventive relief by way of an injunction. To
delay the Commission action while administering the pretrial phase of the private
actions is to risk leaving the defendants in the Commission's suit free to continue
their potentially fraudulent conduct, and thus cause new losses to other investors.
See Bialkin, Securities Law, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 22, col. 1; Brodsky, Corporate
and Securities Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
11 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969), Judge Friendly, referring to violation of the antifraud provision of the securities
laws, stated that an injunction is not an effective remedy because such violations generally
are a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence. Id. at 869 (Friendly, J. concurring).
11 For a general discussion of class actions brought under the securities laws, see 5 H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 8800 (1977).
" See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1974). See also 1 H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1010.2h (1977).
" See Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions In Subsequent Private Damage
Actions-Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (1971).
11 See Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co. & the Seventh Amendment and Collateral
Estoppel, 66 CAL. L. REV. 861, 871 (1978).
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It should be noted,/however, that Shore's impact may be lim-
ited in private actions brought pursuant to those sections of the
securities laws which require a showing that the defendant acted
with scienter. In Shore, the SEC suit and the private action involved
identical issues. Once collateral estoppel effect was given to the
determination that the proxy statements were materially false and
misleading, only the question of' damages remained to be litigated
in the private action.5' In other situations, however, such as actions
brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, a private suitor must establish scienter in order to succeed
while the SEC may only be required to prove negligence.52 Thus, a
jury trial on the question of liability would still be necessary. 3
Shore mandates a flexible approach to future questions con-
cerning the application of collateral estoppel. While the decision
sanctions a liberal use of the doctrine by allowing it to be invoked
offensively in the absence of mutuality, it also requires that all
applications be tempered by considerations of fairness.
Joseph G. Braunreuther
' See 565 F.2d at 818.
52 See Bialkin, supra note 45, at 22, col. 1. The Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), established as the standard in a private damage action
brought under Rule 10b-5, but left open the question whether proof of scienter is required in
an SEC enforcement action. The Second Circuit recently concluded that negligence is suffi-
cient in an SEC action. See SEC v. Aaron, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 2; SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3584 (1979); SEC v. Universal Major
Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally, Comment, Scienter and SEC
Injunctive Suits, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1018 (1977).
"' Brodsky, supra note 45, at 2, col. 2.
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